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Abstract: Together with the Basel III regulatory equity rules, two liquidity ratios have 
been published. Resulting from the illiquidity of some banks during the financial crisis 
in 2008, these ratios shall help to prevent further crisis in the European banking sector. 
But do they really fulfill their aim? This article presents the new liquidity ratios, the 
actual liquidity situation in banks and describes the consequences for banks at a 
simplified example. 
 
It has to be stated that implementing more detailed liquidity frameworks into the 
banking supervision process is necessary. The financial crisis in 2008 showed that 
several banks did not have adequate liquidity risk models and processes to prevent 
illiquidity. But the LCR and the NSFR seem to be wrong methods. Both ratios will 
increase. The implementation of both ratios has to be done very carefully in order to 
prevent this.  
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Introduction 
The IMF states correctly that “the financial crisis highlighted the lack of sound 
liquidity risk management at financial institutions and the need to address systemic 
liquidity risk.” (IMF, 2011, p. 75). As a result, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision developed new principles of banking regulation, known as Basel III. On 
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October 19, 2010, the Basel Committee and central bankers from 27 countries agreed 
to phase in introduction of internationally harmonized global liquidity standards (see 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.09 and Frère/Reuse, 2010, pp. 3). The 
aim of these liquidity standards is to ensure liquidity of the banking system in times of 
stress. The standards establish the minimum liquidity requirements on a short-term and 
long-term basis. The aim of the paper is to discuss the new liquidity ratios critically 
and to answer the question whether they will help to make the European banking 
system more stable. 
 
 
1 Presenting the new Basel III liquidity Rules 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has developed two minimum 
standards for funding liquidity: 
- Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and 
- Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). 
 
These minimum standards were developed to ensure a sufficient level of liquidity of 
banking system: the LCR focuses on the short-term liquidity while the NSFR focuses 
on the long-term liquidity. The objective of the LCR is to “promote short-term 
resilience of a bank’s liquidity risk profile by ensuring that it has sufficient high-
quality liquid assets to survive a significant stress scenario lasting for one month” 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.12, paragraph 4). The objective of the 
NSFR is to “promote resilience over a longer time horizon by creating additional 
incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an 
ongoing basis” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.12, paragraph 4). 
 
These standards establish the minimum levels of liquidity for internationally active 
banks. The standards will be introduced after an observation period. The observation 
period has begun in 2011. The LCR will be introduced on January 1, 2015. The 
introduction of the NSFR is planned for January 1, 2018. 
 
1.1 Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
The aim of the LCR is to ensure the short-term liquidity of a bank. Under this standard, 
the bank has to maintain an adequate level of high-quality liquid assets that can be 
converted into cash to meet its liquidity needs for a 30-day time horizon under a 
significantly severe liquidity stress scenario. The liquidity stress scenario will be 
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specified by supervisors. The LCR standard binds the banks to hold a stock of high-
quality liquid assets to cover the total net cash outflows over a 30-day time horizon 
under the stress scenario. The LCR standard will be defined as follows: 
100%
dayscalendar  30next  over the outflowscash net  Total
assets liquidquality -high ofStock 
>=LCR             (1) 
Figure 1 shows how the parts of the LCR are defined in detail. 
Fig. 1: Parts of the LCR  
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.12, pp. 42–45 and Schäfer, 
2010, p. 7. Stock of high-quality liquid assets 
High-quality liquid assets must meet specific requirements. Generally, high-quality 
liquid assets must be easily and immediately converted into cash at a little or no loss of 
value (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011.06, p. 9). These assets have 
to bear a low credit and market risk, listed on a developed and recognized exchange 
market or have a low correlation with risky assets. The market, where the asset is 
traded, should be of specific characteristics – e.g. low market concentration, active and 
sizable market and so on. 
Level 1 Assets 100%
• Cash
• sovereigns, central banks, public sector
• Domestic sovereign debt for non-0% risk weighted 
sovereigns
Cash Outflows
Numerator:  Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Denominator: Total net cash outflows under stress 
Level 2 Assets 85%
• Sovereign, central bank, and PSE assets qualifying 
for 20% risk weighting
• Qualifying corporate/covered bonds rated AA- or 
higher
• Maximum of 2/3 of adjusted Level 1 assets
LCR =
• Stable deposits (retail/wholesale) min. 5%
• Less stable deposits (retail/wholesale) min. 10%
• Term deposits with maturity >30 days 0%
• Legal entities with operational relationships 25%
• Furher unsecured wholesale 25% – 100%
• Secured funding Level 1 assets 0%
• Secured funding Level 2 assets 15%
• Further secured funding 25% – 100%
• Undrawn portion of committed credit 5% – 100%
• Liabilities at maturity e.g. ABS / SPV 100%




• Reverse Repos 0% – 100%
• Amounts receivable: retail customers 50%
• Amounts receivable: wholesale 50%
• Amounts receivable: financial institutions 100%
max. 75% of outlflows
>100%
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The assets should be unencumbered, which means not pledged to secure, collateralize 
or credit-enhance any transaction. Ideally, the assets should be central bank eligible 
(see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011.06, p. 9). The assets are divided 
into two categories: Level 1 assets and Level 2 assets.  
 
Banks can hold Level 1 assets, for example, in the form of cash, central bank reserves1, 
marketable securities representing claims on (or guaranteed by) sovereigns, central 
banks, the Bank for International Settlements, IMF and others after satisfying stated 
conditions (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.12, paragraph 40). 
Assets of this category can be included without limit. 
 
Level 2 assets are limited to, for example, marketable securities representing claims on 
(or claims guaranteed by) sovereigns or central banks (and others), corporate bonds 
and covered bonds after satisfying certain conditions (see Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2010.12, paragraph 42). This category of assets can comprise only up to 
40 % of the high-quality liquid stock. 
 
Total net cash outflows 
The total net cash outflows are defined as “the total expected cash outflows minus total 
expected cash inflows2 in the specified stress scenario for the subsequent 30 calendar 
days” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.12, paragraph 50). The total 
expected cash inflows are limited to 75 % of the total expected cash outflows. 
 
1.2 Net Stable Funding Ratio 
The NSFR was developed to ensure medium and long-term liquidity of a bank. 
According to this standard, the long-term assets should be funded with at least a 
minimum amount of stable liabilities in relation to their liquidity risk profiles. The 
standard aims to encourage better assessment of liquidity risk across all on-balance and 
off-balance sheet items. The NSFR is defined as follows: 
 
100%
funding stable ofamount  Required
funding stable ofamount  Available
>=NSFR                                           (2) 
                                                     
1
 To the extent that they can be drawn down in time of stress. 
2
 The expected cash inflows and outflows should include interest expected to be received or paid in the 




The “stable funding” means that the types and amounts of equity or liability financing 
are reliable sources of funds over a one-year time horizon (i.e. long-term funding). 
Figure 2 describes the parts of the NSFR in detail. 
 
Available stable funding (ASF) is the sum of a bank’s capital, preferred stock or 
liabilities with maturity of one year or greater and others types of long term liabilities 
(see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.12, paragraph 124). All 
components must be multiplied by the appropriate Associated ASF Factor (from 0 to 
100 %) (according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.12, table 1). 
 
Required stable funding (RSF) can be defined as the sum of the value of the assets held 
and funded by the institution and the amount of OBS activity. Assets and OBS 
activities must be multiplied by the appropriate Associated RSF Factor (more liquid 
assets in the stressed environment receive a lower RSF factor) (according to Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.12, table 2 and 3). 
 
Fig. 2: Parts of the NSFR 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.12, pp. 46–47 and Schäfer, 2010, p. 9. 
 
2 Current situation in Europe 
• Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital and other equity ≥ 1yr 100%
• Other liabilities with an effective maturity of ≥ 1yr 100%
• Stable deposits of retail and small business customers (non-maturity or residual maturity < 1yr) 90%
• Less stable deposits of retail and small business customers (non-maturity or residual maturity < 1yr) 80%
• Wholesale funding provided by non-financial corporate customers, sovereign central banks, multilateral 
development banks and PSEs (non-maturity or residual maturity < 1yr) 50%
Numerator:  Available Stable Funding  Liabilites
Denominator: Required Stable Funding  Assets
NSFR=
• Cash 0%
• Debt issued or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, BIS, IMF, EC, non-central government, multilateral 
development banks with a 0% risk weight under Basel II standardised approach 5%
• Corporate bonds or secured bonds, Rating AA- or better, Basel II-20%, maturity ≥ 1yr 20%
• Corporate bonds or secured bonds, Rating A+ to A-, maturity ≥ 1yr, Gold, equity securities 50%
• Loans to non-financial corporate clients, sovereigns, central banks, and PSEs with a maturity < 1 yr 50%
• Unencumbered residential mortgages of any maturity and other unencumbered loans 65%
• Other loans to retail clients and small businesses having a maturity <1 yr 85%
• All other loans with a maturity ≥ 1yr 100%
• Undrawn amount of committed credit and liquidity facilities 5%
>100%
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The IMF (see IMF, 2011, pp. 75–110) analyzed the worldwide impacts of the new 
liquidity rules. The LCR could not be quantified seriously as the required information 
is not available publicly (see IMF, 2011, p. 78). But the IMF was able to quantify the 
NSFR with available official information for 60 globally oriented banks in 20 countries 
in Europe, North America and Asia. The analysis consists of commercial, universal 
and investment banks. The IMF added 13 further banks that became bankrupt during 
the financial crisis so that the sample consisted of 73 banks (see IMF, 2011, p. 78 for 
the detailed setup). The results are shown in the combined figure 3. 
 
These quantifications lead to several conclusions for the European banking sector: the 
NSFR is better in Asia and North America, Europe shows the lowest ratio of all 
regions. This leads to the conclusion that Europe has to do much more to achieve the 
minimum ratio of 100%. Further, it has to be stated that universal banks show the best 
ratio. This is consistent as these banks have higher volumes of stable refinancing funds. 
Investment banks offer the lowest ratio in figure 3 – these banks cannot have e.g. retail 
deposits. Analyzing specific banks confirms the fact that European banks have the 
lowest NSFR. If these banks want to fulfill the ratio, they have to do significant 
changes in their balance sheets – even though the NSFR does not seem to be a good 
indicator for illiquidity as shown in the last part of figure 3. Some of the banks with a 
low NSFR survived and vice versa, some with a relatively good NSFR became illiquid.  
 
The results for the European banking sector are as follows: the NSFR does not seem to 
be a significant indicator for illiquidity but European banks seem to have more to do to 
achieve the ratios compared to Asia and North America. For Europe it is important to 





Fig. 3: First quantifications of the NSFR 
NSFR by region NSFR by Business Modell 
Net Stable Funding Ratio by Bank, 
2009 
NSFR Estimates for an Expanded Set 
Including Failed Banks, 2006 
Source: Originally taken from IMF, 2011, pp. 79, 81, 82. 
 
3 Setting up a simplified example 
The IMF analyzed the impacts of the NSFR on big banks of each region. Small or 
medium sized banks – which often hold a market share of more than 50% in the private 
customer segment – are not analyzed as the required data are not officially available.  
 
According to this, a fictive bank is modeled. It represents a typical local oriented small 
bank. Its main business is to grant customer loans and to manage customer deposits. 
Failed Banks 
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According to the low yield curve, the deposits have a low maturity while the loans on 
the asset side show maturities of five to ten years. This leads to a natural maturity 
transformation of this bank (see Reuse, 2011 for further details on the maturity 
transformation). The liquidity management has invested into German covered bonds, 
so-called “Pfandbriefe”. These bonds are very liquid and they offer a better yield than 
German sovereign bonds. As a consequence, only a small investment in sovereign 
bonds is made. The balance sheet of this fictive bank including the relevant LCR and 
NSFR weightings might look as shown in table 1. 
 
Tab. 1: Balance sheet of the fictive bank 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
It becomes clear that this bank does not fulfill the actual Basel III liquidity standards. 
So the bank has to react: It switches covered bonds into sovereign bonds and it 
switches short-term interbank finance into long-term interbank finance (examples are 
shown in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.08, p. 24). The result is 
visualized in table 2.  
Position Amount in t€ Interest rate LCR weight NSFR weight Position Amount in t€ Interest rate LCR weight NSFR weight
Cash 20,000 0.00% 100% 0% Stable retail deposits, no maturity or ≤ 30d 50,000 0.00% 5% 90%
Sovereign Bonds 25,000 3.00% 100% 5% less stable retail deposits, no maturity or ≤ 30d 195,000 1.50% 10% 80%
Covered Bonds AAA 250,000 4.00% 85% 20% term deposits
Corporate Bonds, A 25,000 6.00% 0% 50% …maturity , > 30d and ≤ 1yr 550,000 2.50% 0% 80%
Retail loans < 1yr maturity …maturity , > 1yr 0 3.00% 0% 100%
…maturity , > 30d 300,000 6.00% 0% 85% Legal entities with operational relationships < 1yr 80,000 2.50% 25% 50%
…maturity , ≤ 30d 50,000 6.00% 50% 85%
Unencumbered residential mortgages Long term interbank bonds ≥ 1yr 175,000 3.50% 0% 100%
…maturity , > 30d 350,000 5.50% 0% 65% short term interbank finance 300,000 1.25% 100% 0%
…maturity , ≤ 30d 75,000 5.50% 50% 65%
All other loans with maturity ≥ 1yr 405,000 6.50% 0% 100% Equity 150,000  --- 0% 100%
Sum 1,500,000 5.53% Sum 1,500,000 1.90%
Interest Margin = 3.63%
Level 1 Assets + Level 2 Assets
45,000 30,000
LCR = = 34.56%
Cash Outflow - Cash Inflows
342,000 125,000








Tab. 2: Balance sheet of the fictive bank after the implementation of Basel III 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
These two transactions have several consequences on the balance sheet and the income 
statement. First, the natural maturity transformation of the bank is lowered as the 
interbank liabilities have a longer maturity now. This leads to higher costs of interests 
on the liability side. Further, the interest earnings on the asset side decrease as the 
sovereign bonds have a lower interest rate than the covered bonds. The consequence is 
a lower interest margin of 0.22% - assuming that the bank has the possibility to receive 
long-term interbank finance.  
 
  
Position Amount in t€ Interest rate LCR weight NSFR weight Position Amount in t€ Interest rate LCR weight NSFR weight
Cash 20,000 0.00% 100% 0% Stable retail deposits, no maturity or ≤ 30d 50,000 0.00% 5% 90%
Sovereign Bonds 125,000 3.00% 100% 5% less stable retail deposits, no maturity or ≤ 30d 195,000 1.50% 10% 80%
Covered Bonds AAA 150,000 4.00% 85% 20% term deposits
Corporate Bonds, A 25,000 6.00% 0% 50% …maturity , > 30d and ≤ 1yr 550,000 2.50% 0% 80%
Retail loans < 1yr maturity …maturity , > 1yr 0 3.00% 0% 100%
…maturity , > 30d 300,000 6.00% 0% 85% Legal entities with operational relationships < 1yr 80,000 2.50% 25% 50%
…maturity , ≤ 30d 50,000 6.00% 50% 85%
Unencumbered residential mortgages Long term interbank bonds ≥ 1yr 275,000 3.50% 0% 100%
…maturity , > 30d 350,000 5.50% 0% 65% short term interbank finance 200,000 1.25% 100% 0%
…maturity , ≤ 30d 75,000 5.50% 50% 65%
All other loans with maturity ≥ 1yr 405,000 6.50% 0% 100% Equity 150,000  --- 0% 100%
Sum 1,500,000 5.46% Sum 1,500,000 2.05%
Interest Margin = 3.41%
Level 1 Assets + Level 2 Assets
145,000 96,667
LCR = = 206.55%
Cash Outflow - Cash Inflows
242,000 125,000






Financial Assets and Investing 
16 
Conclusion and critical outlook 
The simplified example shows the results in the European banking sector. Sovereign 
bonds will become more attractive – as long as they have a 0% risk weight asset. 
European banks might come to the conclusion that mixing domestic sovereign bonds 
and “high yield European sovereign bonds” might be the best solution to meet the 
LCR. In the authors’ opinion, this is not the right way to regulate banks. 
 
Further, this will result in more long-term interbank finance. But if all banks have to 
fulfill these ratios, the worst case scenario might appear: as all banks need long-term 
money, no bank will offer it – or only at a very high price. This will lead to pressure in 
the banking sector as well. In addition, the attractive retail customer savings will 
become more and more important for banks. As all banks will come to this conclusion, 
this will lead to higher prices of these deposits. The pressure onto the interest margin 
might lead to a higher demand at interest rate swaps in order to increase the margin by 
a derivative maturity transformation. In the worst case, a bubble on the derivative 
market might be the consequence. Last, the banks will be more critical in granting 
loans so that economy will probably have problems to receive money.  
 
In the authors’ opinion it is right to regulate liquidity of the European banking sector, 
but the presented LCR and NSFR lead to additional risks that should be prevented. 
Especially, the NSFR has to be seen critically as Europe shows the lowest ratios in the 
international comparison. The necessary changes in the balance sheets are 
consequently high (examples are shown in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2010.08, p. 24). So an implementation has to be done very carefully and has to be 
long-term oriented. Europe shall insist on a late introduction date for the NSFR. 2018 
is the earliest possible implementation period. The economic costs resulting from Basel 
III have to be considered – even though the Basel Committee tries to convince the 
public that the economic benefits are higher than the economic costs (discussed in 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.08, p. 5). The LCR offers several 
problems as well: the definition of the Level 1 assets has to be seen critically. During 
the integration process into the European law, banking supervisors should care for 
implementing those assets that are really liquid in Europe. Otherwise a destabilization 
of the markets might be the consequence. The implementation period 2015 might be 





In combination with the higher regulatory equity requirements, banks are faced with 
the following problem: they need to have a lower risk position, to hold higher liquidity 
and to increase equity to meet Basel III. This might lead to a new banking crisis if 
Europe makes too many mistakes during the implementation process. A possibility to 
prevent this is to act like the USA intend to: applying Basel III only to banks that have 
a significant influence on the stability of the banking sector (discussed in Haasis, 
2011). This means vice versa that small savings and cooperative banks in Europe do 
not have to meet all Basel III rules. In the authors’ opinion, this is the right way – 
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